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BITCH v. WHORE: THE CURRENT TREND
TO DEFINE THE REQUIREMENTS OF AN
ACTIONABLE HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT
CLAIM IN VERBAL SEXUAL HARASSMENT
CASES
JAMIE LYNN COOK*

INTRODUCTION

If you want to avoid liability for sexual harassment under
Title VII,1 use the term "bitch" when referring to female
employees. At least, that is what the Seventh Circuit leads one to
believe with its holding that a male co-worker's repeated usage of
"sick bitch" in reference to a female employee was not genderbased for the purposes of Title VII.2 However, the court stated, as
an example, that the terms "fucking broads" and "fucking cunts"
would be more gender-based than the term "bitch," and, therefore,
would be actionable. 3
One of the problems with sexual harassment law is the courts'
inability to establish a bright-line test that would determine what
type of conduct is and is not actionable." With considerable gray
areas in the law, one of the biggest problems arises when the
alleged harassing conduct is verbal, with little or no physical
touching involved.5 The federal courts have traditionally dealt
* J.D. Candidate, June 2000. The Author would like to thank Professor
Julie Spanbauer of the John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois, for her
assistance and guidance on this Comment.
1. Title VII is the common name of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1964).
2. Galloway v. General Motors Serv. Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164, 1167
(7th Cir. 1996).
3. Id. at 1168. (citing Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459,

1464 (9th Cir. 1994)). In Steiner, the Ninth Circuit held that a supervisor's
repeated use of "dumb fucking broad," "cunt," and "fucking cunt" in reference
to a female employee established a prima facie case of hostile work
environment sexual harassment. Id. at 1462.
4. Rachel Mead Zweighaft, Comment, What's the Harm? The Legal
Accommodations of Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment, 18 COMP. LAB.
L.J. 434, 435 (1997).
5. See Joshua F. Thorpe, Note, Gender-Based Harassmentand the Hostile
Work Environment, 1990 DuKE L.J. 1361, 1377-78 (1990) (discussing the need
for courts to recognize gender-based harassment as separate from sexual
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with this problem by creating limits on the hostile environment
claim. In keeping with the tradition of placing limits on hostile
environment claims, the federal courts currently use three
different tests to determine whether verbal sexual harassment
creates a hostile environment: the gender relation test,7 the sexual
nature test,8 and the personal animosity test."
This Comment examines the attempt by the federal courts to
further define what is required to establish a prima facie case for
verbal sexual harassment cases. Part L.A discusses the historical
beginnings of the hostile environment claim by looking at the
enactment of Title VII by Congress, its beginnings as it was
applied to race discrimination claims, and its interpretation by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Part I.B discusses
how the hostile environment sexual harassment claim has been

harassment, particularly when the alleged behavior is non-sexual in nature).
"Courts have yet to hold clearly and uniformly that a pattern of gender-based
harassment alone constitutes a sufficient predicate for a hostile work
environment action." Id. at 1377.
6. Hostile environment discrimination does not affect economic aspects of
the plaintiffs employment, such as promotion, discharge, or salary, but rather
deprives an employee of "the right to work in an environment free from
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult." Meritor Sav. Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). In quid pro quo harassment, on the other
hand, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the employee is a member of a protected
class; (2) the employee was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment in the
form of sexual advances or requests for sexual favors; (3) the harassment
complained of was based on sex; (4) the employee's submission to the
unwelcome advances was an express or implied condition for receiving job
benefits, or that the employee's refusal to submit to a supervisor's sexual
demands resulted in a tangible job detriment; and (5) the existence of
employer liability. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909 (11th Cir.
1982). See, e.g., Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 513 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding
that evidence presented by a deaf-mute employee that her employer
conditioned employment benefits on sexual favors established a claim of quid
pro quo harassment); Showalter v. Allison Reed Group, Inc., 767 F. Supp.
1205, 1208-09, 1212 (D.R.I. 1991) (holding that evidence that employees were

required to participate in sexual liaisons with supervisor's secretary as a
condition of continued employment established a claim of quid pro quo
harassment).
7. Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1537 (10th Cir. 1995).
Discussing the gender relation test, the court stated that "[any harassment of
an employee 'that would not occur but for the sex of the employee... may, if
sufficiently patterned or pervasive, comprise an illegal condition of
employment under Title VII.' Id.
8. Turley v. Union Carbide Corp., 618 F. Supp. 1438, 1441-42 (S.D. W. Va.
1985). The sexual nature test states that an employee is not sexually
harassed where the alleged harassment is non-sexual in nature. Id. at 1442.

9. Galloway v. General Motors Serv. Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164, 1168
(7th Cir. 1996). The personal animosity test states that when a male coworker's comments to a female employee are based on a personal animosity
rather than a belief that "women did not belong in the work force," a hostile
working environment is not created under Title VII. Id.
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interpreted by the courts from its creation in 1981 to the present.
Part II discusses the development of the verbal sexual harassment
claim and the current tests used by federal courts to define the
requirements of a prima facie case. Part III analyzes Supreme
Court cases and concludes that there is a need for the Court to
further define a prima facie case of verbal sexual harassment.
Finally, Part IV proposes that the Supreme Court should adopt
the approach of some of the lower federal courts with regard to
verbal sexual harassment cases and place the emphasis on
disparate treatment rather than sex in order to be consistent with
the purpose of Title VII.
I.

ORIGINS OF THE HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT CLAIM

A. The Evolution of the Unexpected
Senator Howard W. Smith of Virginia had no idea that his
proposal to add sex as a classification to the pending Title VII bill
would result in expanding employment discrimination law into
realms never imagined.' ° Senator Smith's proposal was added at
the last minute in an attempt to defeat the bill. 1 His ploy,
proposing the addition of the word "sex" with the expectation that
the bill would not be approved, was thwarted when Title VII was
passed as amended with sex as a classification."2 Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 made it "an unlawful employment practice
for an employer.., to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin." 3 The courts, however, were left with a limited
10. Jeff Bleich & Kelly Klaus, Sexual Harassment: The Supreme Court May
Yet Have Its Biggest Say on the Subject, 58 OR. ST. B. BULL. 15, 15 (1998).
11. Id. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64. The amendment the Senator proposed
surprisingly received support from women's rights groups and from his
opponents, who viewed the addition of sex as a classification as "a great trick."

Bleich & Klaus, supra note 10, at 15.
12. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64. Curiously enough, most of the votes against

the act were by the same people who voted for the amendment. Bleich &
Klaus, supra note 10, at 15.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994). Congress expected that Title VII
would result in the "removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers

to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the
basis of racial or other impermissible classification." Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). See Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978) (stating that by "forbidding employers
to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women")
(quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (1971)). But
see Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 621 (6th Cir. 1986) (stating that
while Title VII was created to provide women with equal employment

opportunities, it was not "designed to bring about a magical transformation in
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legislative history to guide them in interpreting the words of the
Act prohibiting employment discrimination "based on sex." 4
The concept of "hostile environment claims" under Title VII
initially developed in the context of race-based discrimination
claims. 5 In Rogers v. EEOC, the Fifth Circuit held that a
workplace "heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimination"
gave rise to a Title VII claim. 6 The Rogers court recognized the
definition of hostile environment claims by ruling that an
employee's work atmosphere constituted a protected "term" or
"condition" of employment under Title VII. 17

the social mores of American workers").
The Supreme Court
14. Bleich & Klaus, supra note 10, at 15.
acknowledged this in Meritor. 477 U.S. at 64.
15. Robert J. Gregory, You Can Call Me A "Bitch" Just Don't Use the "NWord": Some Thoughts On Galloway v. General Motors Service Parts
Operationsand Rodgers v. Western-SouthernLife Insurance Co., 46 DEPAUL L.

REV. 741, 743 (1997).

The courts at this time also recognized hostile

environment actions based on ethnic and religious discrimination. Thorpe,
supra note 5, at 1367. See Friend v. Leidinger, 588 F.2d 61, 68-69 (4th Cir.
1978) (Buzner, J., concurring) (disagreeing with majority that discrimination
of black firefighters did not amount to violation of Title VII); Firefighters Inst.
For Racial Equal. v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514-15 (8th Cir. 1977)
(determining that the city fire department's practice of excluding blacks from
informal "supper clubs" violates its duty under Title VII "to provide a
nondiscriminatory working environment"); Lucero v. Beth Israel Hosp. &
Geriatric Ctr., 479 F. Supp. 452, 454 (D. Colo. 1979) (holding that a black
supervisor's continual harassment of non-black employees violated Title VII);
United States v. City of Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. 612, 631-35 (W.D.N.Y. 1978)
(determining that widespread and egregious racial harassment of blacks in
city's police and fire departments violated Title VII); Gray v. Greyhound Lines,
545 F.2d 169, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that discriminatory hiring
practices concerning black bus drivers violated Title VII).
16. 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971). In Rogers, a Hispanic employee
alleged that her employers, who were optometrists, discriminated against her
by dividing patients by national origin. Id. at 236. The court stated in dicta
that "the relationship between an employee and his working environment is of
such significance as to be entitled to statutory protection." Id. at 237-38.
Furthermore, the court determined that the intent of Congress in enacting
Section 2000e-2(a)(1) was to "eradicate" the type of employment practices
demonstrated in the case. Id. at 238.
17. Id. Before Rogers, Title VII claims dealt mainly with "terms" of
employment such as hiring, firing, and promotion. Id. Rogers, however,
limited the availability of hostile environment claims by stating that a "mere
utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in
an employee" does not effect the terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment. Id. See Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568
F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir. 1977) (deciding that derogatory comments made by a
supervisor did not rise to the level necessary to constitute a violation of Title
VII); Smith v. Amoco Chems. Corp., No. 76-G-106, 1979 WL 276, at *2 (S.D.
Tex. July 20, 1979) (holding that verbal passes made at female operator
trainee did not rise to level necessary to constitute violation of Title VII);
Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 439 F. Supp. 55, 74-75 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
(concluding that a claim by black production and maintenance employees
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The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
was created by Congress in a provision of Title VII to further
enforce the Act. 18 The EEOC's primary responsibility is to
investigate private and public employment complaints of
discrimination, including sexual harassment.1 9 In 1980, the EEOC
published a set of guidelines regarding sexual harassment. 0
The Supreme Court has used the EEOC guidelines, stating
"these Guidelines, 'while not controlling upon the courts by reason
of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance.'"21 The EEOC has issued other guidelines such as
"Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment. " ' 2 In these
guidelines, the EEOC provided guidance set forth in recently
concerning racially discriminatory atmosphere "by no means was shown to be
pervasive" as required by Title VII).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1994).
19. LYNNE EISAGUIRRE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK
82 (1997). One of the EEOC's responsibilities is to gather evidence from
employers. Id. However, the EEOC's primary purpose is to negotiate with the
employer to protect the employee's rights granted under Title VII. Id. If the
negotiation fails, the EEOC can file suit or issue the employee a "right to sue"
letter. Id. Because some 15,500 sexual harassment claims are currently filed
each year with the EEOC, the EEOC most often issues a "right to sue" letter.
John Cloud, Sex and the Law: Sexual Harassment Can Mean Firing Victims
Who Don't Give In or Merely Telling A Dirty Joke; Clinton's Fate Rests On
Laws That Tie Even Lawyers Into Knots, TIME, Mar. 23, 1998, at 48, 49. Out
of these filings, juries have returned over 500 verdicts for plaintiffs since 1991.
Id.
20. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1999). The Guidelines define sexual harassment
as:
[ulnwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual
harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's
employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an
individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such
individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an

intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
Id.
21. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (quoting General
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976)). See Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (stating that under the Act, the administrator's
decisions are not governing upon the courts; however, they are to be regarded
by courts and litigants as a source of guidance); see also Walter v. KFGO
Radio, 518 F. Supp. 1309, 1315 (D.N.D. 1981) (stating that the guidelines are
entitled to "great deference"); Caldwell v. Hodgeman, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1647, 1649 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1981) (stating that the guidelines were
created to aid in courts' determinations of what types of conduct are violations
of Title VII); Continental Can Co. v. State, 297 N.W.2d 241, 248 (Minn. 1980)
(applying the interim EEOC guidelines).
22. EEOC, PUB. No. N-915-050, POLICY GUIDANCE ON CURRENT ISSUES OF
SEXUAL HARASSMENT (1990).
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developed cases in sexual harassment law.2" The courts continue
to rely on these guidelines to make and transform the area of
sexual harassment law.
B. Sexual Harassment in the JudicialArena
Courts did not apply the hostile environment theory
developed in Rogers to sexual harassment cases until 1976, when
the District Court for the District of Columbia recognized sexual
harassment as a form of sex discrimination in Williams v. Saxbe.2'
In 1979, Professor Catharine A. MacKinnon published her25
influential book, Sexual Harassment of Working Women.
Professor MacKinnon advocated expansion of Title VII not only to
"quid pro quo" 26 claims, but also to "hostile workplace " 21 sexual
23. Id. at 1. This new set of guidelines was created to aid in determining
the development of sexual harassment law after Meritor, dealing with issues
such as: (1) whether sexual conduct is "unwelcome"; (2) whether a work
environment is sexually "hostile"; (3) when employers are liable for sexual
harassment by supervisors; and (4) how to evaluate preventative and remedial
action taken in response to claims of sexual harassment. Id. at 4.
24. 413 F. Supp. 654, 657-58 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Williams alleged she was
subjected to a sexual advance from her supervisor. Id. at 655. When she
declined his advances, her supervisor engaged in a pattern of harassing and
humiliating her. Id. A year later in Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 (D.C.

Cir. 1977), quid pro quo sexual harassment was held to be actionable under
Title VII. Id. The federal courts' initial resistance was "quite strong" and
sexual harassment was explained as "resulting from biological forces, physical
attraction, and the learned role of men as initiators of sexual activity."
Zweighaft, supra note 4, at 446. One of the theories that supports this type of
analysis is the "socio-biological theory of behavior." STEPHEN J. MOREWITZ,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA 182 (1996). Under
this theory, men are assumed to naturally have stronger sexual urges than
women. Id. Thus, men should be given a wide range in expressing their
sexual urges. Id.
25. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 32-40 (1979).
26. See supra note 6 for a definition and discussion of quid pro quo
harassment. See also Barnes, 561 F.2d at 984-85 (reversing summary
judgment for employer who attempted to abolish female employee's position
after she refused demands for sexual favors); Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d
211, 212-13 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that Title VII was violated where plaintiff
was discharged when she refused to cooperate with her supervisor's sexual
advances). The harms of sexual requests and behavior in quid pro quo
harassment are easier to calculate than the harms of hostile environment
harassment. Zweighaft, supra note 4, at 436-37. Employer liability is also
easier to calculate in quid pro quo cases now that the Supreme Court has
decided two cases dealing with the subject. In both, the Court ruled that
employers are vicariously liable for a supervisor's sexual harassment when the
worker's immediate supervisor takes a tangible employment action against
the worker, such as firing, failing to promote, or changing benefits. Faragher
v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742, 764-65 (1998).
27. See definition supra note 6 for a discussion of hostile environment
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harassment claims, which the Supreme Court later recognized as
being entitled to protection.8
Quid pro quo claims, which allege that an employee must
choose between suffering adverse employment actions or
submitting to sexual demands, were the first to be recognized
under Title VII. ' The second type of sexual harassment, hostile
environment, as proposed by Professor MacKinnon, was not
recognized until 1981, when the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia explicitly adopted her definition when it held that the
creation of a hostile work environment violated Title VII. ° In
Bundy v. Jackson,"' a female employee was sexually propositioned
by a fellow employee as well as by her two supervisors at the
District of Columbia Department of Corrections.3 2 By looking at
"numerous [racial discrimination] cases finding Title VII violations
where an employer created or condoned a substantially
discriminatory work environment, regardless of whether the
complaining employees lost any tangible job benefits," the court
found that sex discrimination could be found to violate Title VII.'
A year later, the Eleventh Circuit handed down a similar
holding in Henson v. City of Dundee."' In Henson, a female police
dispatcher alleged that she and other female dispatchers were
subjected to sexual harassment by the chief of the Dundee Police
Citing Rogers,3 the Court found that sexual
Department. '
discrimination.

In evaluating a hostile environment claim, a case-by-case

analysis must be used to weigh the "reasonableness" of the claim against the
behavior alleged and the environment of the claimant's workplace. Zweighaft,
supra note 4, at 441.
28. MACKINNON, supra note 25, at 40-47.
29. See Williams, 413 F. Supp. at 662 (finding a connection between the
plaintiffs rejection of her supervisor's sexual advances and his subsequent
harassment of her).
30. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 939. Bundy's co-worker, Delbert Jackson, sexually propositioned

her. Id. One of her supervisors, Arthur Burton, continually called her into his
office and requested that she spend the afternoon with him at his apartment.
Id. at 940. He also asked her about her own sexual "proclivities." Id. Another
supervisor, James Gainey, asked her to join him at a motel and on a trip to the
Bahamas. Id. Upon reporting the harassment to Burton and to Gainey's

supervisor, Bundy said he told her that "any man in his right mind would
want to rape you." Id.
33. Id. at 943-44 (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)).
34. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
35. Id. at 899. This case dealt with three different types of harassment

claims. Id. The first was a claim that the chief created a hostile and offensive
working environment by subjecting Henson to sexual inquiries and
vulgarities. Id. The second was a quid pro quo claim claiming that the chief
requested that she have sexual relations with him. Id. The third claim was
for constructive discharge, based upon plaintiffs resignation after the chief's
conduct. Id. This Comment focuses only on the hostile environment claim.
36. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 234.
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harassment was sex discrimination and noted that "[slurely, a
requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse
in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a
living can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of
racial epithets." 37

Reinforcing its strong language, the Henson

court went further than the Bundy Court and outlined the
elements needed to establish a hostile environment claim: (1) the
employee must belong to a protected group; (2) the employee must
have been subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the
harassment must have been based upon sex; (4) the employee
must have suffered an adverse employment action as a result of
her refusal of the advances; and (5) the employer must be
responsible.38
It was on this basis that the Supreme Court finally approved
the hostile environment cause of action under Title VII in its
landmark decision Meritor Sabings Bank v. Vinson.39 In Meritor,
the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff may establish a Title VII
violation by proving that discrimination based on sex created a
hostile or abusive work environment. ' Explicitly adopting the
reasoning in Henson, the Court went on to note that Title VII was
37. Henson, 682 F.2d at 902. The court mentioned the Bundy case as
support for its holding. Id. Furthermore, the court also noted and gave
deference to the EEOC Guidelines on Sexual Harassment. Id. at 903. See also
Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254-55 (4th Cir. 1983) (noting analysis of quid pro
quo and hostile environment sexual harassment in the EEOC guidelines);
Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780, 784 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (citing
EEOC guidelines as authority for elements of an actionable hostile
environment sexual harassment claim).
38. Henson, 682 F.2d at 903-05. After the plaintiff presents a prima facie
case of discrimination, a defendant must produce adequate evidence that the
defendant acted for a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason." McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 793 (1973). See also Weiss v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 990 F.2d 333, 336 (7th Cir. 1993) (concluding that Coca-Cola
discharged Weiss for failure to meet company expectations with regard to
responsibilities in inventory counts); Hinton v. Methodist Hosp., 779 F. Supp.
956, 961 (N.D. Ind. 1991) (finding that Methodist Hospital fired Hinton only
after she was caught stealing drugs and carrying a weapon while on duty);
Neville v. Taft Broad. Co., 42 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1314, 1317-24
(W.D.N.Y. 1987) (concluding that account executive was discharged after she
made errors in accounts, did not inform clients of preempted spots, failed to
properly service her accounts, failed to meet budgets, accumulated excessive
charges, and received complaints from clients); Bohen v. City of E. Chicago,
622 F. Supp. 1234, 1237 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (concluding that the plaintiffs
behavior made her counterproductive to the "good order, discipline, and
security" at the fire department).
39. 477 U.S. 57, 57 (1986). In Meritor, a female bank employee brought a
sexual harassment suit against the bank and her supervisor. Id. at 60. She
alleged that the supervisor repeatedly asked her for sexual favors, fondled her
in front of her co-workers, followed her into the women's restroom, exposed
himself, and forcibly raped her. Id.
40. Id. at 66.
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not limited to "economic and tangible injury," which meant that
cases resulting in non-economic injury were also cognizable.4"
The Court then proceeded to adopt what is perhaps the most
important and the most confusing standard for evaluating a
hostile environment claim. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, stated that in order to be actionable, the alleged conduct
must be "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of
[the victim's] employment and create an abusive working
The Court also addressed the issue of
environment."' 2
"voluntariness," holding that the "unwelcomeness" of the sexual
conduct was the most important factor in assessing whether it
constituted sexual harassment, rather than whether the victim
The Court concluded, however, that
participated willingly.'
evidence of the employee's "provocative dress and sexual fantasies"
could be considered as a defense to the sexual harassment claim."
Shortly after the Supreme Court rendered its decision in
Meritor, the Sixth Circuit decided Rabidue v. Osceola Refining
Co." Instead of applying the broad language contained in Meritor,
the court created a new standard." The plaintiff, Vivian Rabidue,
alleged that her supervisor's obscene comments to her and his
display of nude photographs of women created an offensive
working environment. 7 Using a "reasonable person" standard,"
41. Id. at 64-65. The Supreme Court reasoned that making a hostile
environment claim stand on whether or not the injury was economic was
contrary to congressional intent and the EEOC guidelines. Id.
42. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904).
43. Id. at 68.
44. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69. In 1994, however, President Clinton signed the
Violence Against Women Act, which restricts the kinds of evidence concerning
a plaintiffs past that defendants can present in sexual harassment cases. 42

U.S.C. § 13942(c) (1994). This is especially applicable to instances in which
the harasser is accused of assault. Id. The restriction of evidence in sex
offense cases was later adopted as Federal Rule of Evidence 412. FED. R.
EVID. 412.
45. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
46. Zweighaft, supra note 4, at 450.
47. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 615.

The supervisor was also found to have

generally referred to women as "whores," "cunt," "pussy," and "tits." Id. at
624.

The language that Rabidue claims the supervisor directed at her

specifically was "[aill that bitch needs is a good lay." Id.
48. There is a considerable split between the federal courts regarding
whether to apply a "reasonable person" standard or a "reasonable woman"
standard when deciding hostile environment sexual harassment cases.
Compare Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991), and Andrews v.
City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990), and Yates v. Avco
Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987), and Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus.,
989 F.2d 959, 962 (8th Cir. 1993), and Canada v. Boyd Group, Inc., 809 F.
Supp. 771, 776 (D. Nev. 1992), and Mills v. Amoco Performance Prod., Inc.,
872 F. Supp. 975, 988 (S.D. Ga. 1994), and Robinson v. Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1991), and Jenson v.
Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847, 875-76 (D. Minn. 1993) (applying the
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the court required the plaintiff to show that the harassment
"unreasonably interfered with her work performance and created
an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment that
affected seriously her psychological well-being. "
Application of the stringent "serious psychological harm" test
was prevalent in the circuits until the Supreme Court decided
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.5 ° The Supreme Court rejected the
stringent standard in Henson, and instead took the "middle path"
by holding that the conduct need not "'seriously affect[ I [an
employee's] psychological well-being' or [lead the employee] to
'suffer injury' for the plaintiff to succeed in a hostile environment
claim.51 The Court also adopted a test that requires a court to look
at all the circumstances in determining whether an environment
is "hostile" or "abusive." 2

reasonable woman standard), with Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections
Dep't, 916 F.2d 572, 580 (10th Cir. 1990), and Morgan v. Massachusetts Gen.
Hosp., 901 F.2d 186, 193 (1st Cir. 1990), and Bennett v. New York City Dep't
of Corrections, 705 F. Supp. 979, 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), and Hollis v.
Fleetguard, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 631, 636-37 (M.D. Tenn. 1987) (applying the
reasonable person standard).
49. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 622. This test became commonly known as the
"serious psychological harm test." See also Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1510 (11th Cir. 1989) (determining that a prima facie case
of hostile environment sexual harassment requires the plaintiff to show that

the harassment was severe enough to affect her "psychological stability");
Downes v. Federal Aviation Admin., 775 F.2d 288, 292 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(requiring that the plaintiff show that the misconduct was "sufficiently severe
and persistent to affect seriously [his or her] psychological well-being").
50. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
51. Id. at 22. Justice O'Connor stated that Title VII was applicable "before
the harassing conduct leads to a nervous breakdown." Id. She reasoned that
an abusive work environment and a negative affect on an employee's job
performance can be created short of "seriously affect[ing] [one's] psychological
well-being." Id. "Middle path" is the term she gave the Court's standard,
stating that it is in between making actionable any conduct that is "merely
offensive" and going as far as demanding proof of "psychological injury." Id. at
21. The holding did not suggest that sexual harassment could not have a
severe psychological impact on a victim. Id. at 22. Surveys have shown that
mild impacts on victims of sexual harassment can include nervousness,
irritability, uncontrollable anger, and disgust. MOREWIrz, supra note 24, at
157.
Physical health problems, however, have ranged from insomnia,
gastrointestinal problems, and loss of weight to heart diseases, arthritis,
diabetes, gastrointestinal disorders, skin diseases, chest and back pains,
headaches, fatigue, and loss of sexual interest. Id. at 157-58.
52. Harris,510 U.S. at 23. These circumstances include: "the frequency of
the conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating,
or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee's work performance." Id. See also Vance, 863 F.2d at 1510 (stating
that a jury "does not necessarily examine each alleged incident of harassment

in a vacuum. What may appear to be a legitimate justification for a single
incident of alleged harassment may look pretextual when viewed in the
context of several other related incidents."); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia,
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This attempt by the Court to further define the hostile
environment cause of action has left the federal courts with little
guidance as to exactly what constitutes actionable harassment.'
When a case involves verbal harassment with little or no touching,
the analysis becomes even more unclear. It is this lack of guidance
and broad language that has allowed lower courts to continually
define the hostile environment sexual harassment claim

narrowly."
II. CURRENT TESTS USED TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF
VERBAL SEXUAL HARASSMENT

This Part discusses the creation of the gender relation, sexual
nature, and personal animosity tests by the lower federal courts to
determine which claims of verbal sexual harassment are
actionable and which are not.55

A. The Gender Relation Test
The exact language of Title VII clearly prohibits
discrimination "because of sex." However, as precise as that
language might seem, its application is ambiguous, and courts

895 F.2d 1469, 1484 (3d Cir. 1990) ("A play cannot be understood on the basis
of some of its scenes, but only on its entire performance, and similarly, a
discrimination analysis must concentrate not on individual incidents, but on

the overall scenario."). It is worthwhile to note that the Supreme Court in
dictum hinted that it favors the application of a "reasonable person" standard.

Harris,510 U.S. at 21.
53. Bleich & Klaus, supra note 10, at 16. Even though there is still a
dispute in the courts over the definition of an actionable hostile environment
claim, the next controversial legal topic will involve the First Amendment.
Cloud, supra note 19, at 55. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and

Workplace Harassment,39 UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1819-43 (1992) (arguing that
some hostile environment claims violate the First Amendment); Kingsley R.
Brown, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile Environment Harassment and the
First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481, 501-11 (1991) (arguing that federal

enforcement of some

hostile environment claims violates the First

Amendment); Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A
Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CI. L. REV. 225, 242 (1992) (noting that the law may
limit the intrusions one must endure at work to those that relate to work).
54. Vicki Schultz, a professor at Yale Law School, has argued that:
[T]he popular view of harassment is both too narrow and too broad. Too
narrow, because the focus on rooting out unwanted sexual activity has
allowed us to feel good about protecting women from sexual abuse while
leading us to overlook equally pernicious forms of gender-based
mistreatment. Too broad, because the emphasis on sexual conduct has
encouraged some companies to ban all forms of sexual interaction, even
when these do not threaten women's equality on the job.
Vicki Schultz, Sex Is The Least Of It: Let's Focus HarassmentLaw On Work,
Not Sex, THE NATION, May 25, 1998, at 12.
55. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text for a definition of the
gender relation, sexual nature, and personal animosity tests.
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continually grapple with what type of conduct is and is not
actionable under the statute.5
In order to succeed with a claim under Title VII, the federal
courts require that a plaintiff must show that the defendant's
conduct would not have occurred "but for" the victim's sex." This
test has evolved to mean that a female plaintiff must prove that
she was "exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of
employment to which members of the other sex were not
exposed. " '
In verbal sexual harassment cases, the court's determination
of whether the verbal conduct alleged was based on gender is
rooted in whether the defendant's comments were gender-related
or gender-neutral.59 For example, in Volk v. Coler, ° the Seventh
56. One of the main problems with determining actionable conduct is that
typically in sexual harassment cases, the conduct alleged is often "lewd or
shocking," whereas gender-based conduct is typically non-sexual in nature.
Frank S. Ravitch, Contextualizing Gender Harassment: Providing An
Analytical Framework for an Emerging Concept in DiscriminationLaw, 3 DET.
C.L. REV. 853, 861-63 (1995).
57. See McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (concluding
that a supervisor's use of physical force towards an employee "because of that
employee's sex" was a violation of Title VII); EEOC v. A. Sam & Sons Produce
Co., 872 F. Supp. 29, 35-36 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (concluding that a supervisor's
repeated use of the word "whore" to refer to female employees and his
statement that the female employees should "go fuck themselves" would not
have occurred "but for" the plaintiffs gender); Bennett v. Corroon & Black
Corp., 517 So. 2d 1245, 1247 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that sexually explicit
cartoons of the plaintiff in the men's restroom were not labeled with her name
merely because she was female). Some recent cases have heightened the "but
for" requirement and demand a showing that the harassment was motivated
by "gender animus." See Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881,
905 (1st Cir. 1988) (stating that "this attack, although not explicitly sexual,
was nonetheless charged with anti-female animus"); Penry v. Federal Home
Loan Bank of Topeka, 970 F. Supp. 833, 838 (D. Kan. 1997) (stating that "this
conduct, though offensive, cannot be construed as being motivated by sexual
animus or gender bias"); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F.
Supp. 1486, 1522 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (explaining that causation may be proven
by evidence of "harassing behavior lacking a sexually explicit content but
directed at women and motivated by animus against women").
58. Justice Scalia, in one of the Supreme Court's most recent opinions
dealing with sexual harassment, placed emphasis on the "because of sex"
provision set out in Title VII and stated that the critical issue is "whether
members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of
employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed." Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (quoting Harris v.
Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)). This case was
not only important because the majority adopted Justice Ginsburg's
concurring opinion in Harris,but rather because the Court extended Title VII
protection to same-sex harassment cases. Id. at 1003. However, the Court
once again did not provide any further analysis to aid lower courts in
determining what type of conduct would be actionable.
59. Compare Galloway v. General Motors Serv. Parts Operations, 78 F.3d
1164, 1167 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a co-worker's repeated usage of "sick
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Circuit found substantial evidence to support a sexual harassment
claim where a female plaintiffs supervisor frequently referred to
the plaintiff as "hon," "honey," "babe," and "tiger."61 Because the
supervisor's words were words that are frequently used to refer to
women and not men, the court considered
them to be gender2
related for the purposes of Title VII.

Another clear case of hostile environment sexual harassment
based on gender was demonstrated in Huddleston v. Roger Dean
Chevrolet, Inc.' In Huddleston, the female plaintiff was the first
woman to work as a sales representative at a car dealership.'
Male sales representatives interfered with her sales efforts by
blocking every door to the showroom floor to keep her from
meeting new customers and by calling her a "bitch" and a "whore"
in front of customers. 5 Furthermore, on one occasion the sales
manager grabbed the plaintiff by the arm and physically moved
her a few feet while criticizing her job performance."
The Eleventh
Circuit held that
the male
sales
representatives'
conduct created a hostile environment. 7
However, in applying the gender relation test, the court
concentrated on the sales manager's physical act of moving the
plaintiff, instead of the male sales representatives' attempts to
interfere with the plaintiffs work.6
Further, in making its
bitch" in reference to female employee was not gender related), and Gross v.
Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1543 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding that a
supervisor's directive to female plaintiff that she get her "ass back in the
truck" was gender-neutral), and Gillum v. Federal Home Loan Bank of
Topeka, 970 F. Supp. 833, 851 (D. Kan. 1997) (holding that a supervisor's
advice to female subordinate that she walk to lose weight off her hips and
yelling to another female employee to "get your buns over here" did not
demonstrate gender discrimination), and Young v. Finish Line, Inc., 68 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 975, 978 (D. Kan. 1995) (holding that employer's
reference to female employee as "dumb" was not gender-based), with Steiner v.
Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that
supervisor's reference to female employee as "dumb fucking broads" and
"fucking cunts" established a prima facie case of hostile environment sexual
harassment), and EEOC v. A. Sam & Sons Produce Co., 872 F. Supp. 29, 35
(W.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that vice president's references to a female employee
as a "whore" constituted hostile environment sexual harassment), and Kulp v.
Dick Horrigan VW, Inc., 1994 WL 3393, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that
female plaintiff who was called a "slut" by a co-worker had stated a hostile
environment claim).
60. 845 F.2d 1422 (7th Cir. 1988).
61. Id. at 1426.
62. Id. at 1432-34.
63. 845 F.2d 900 (11th Cir. 1988).
64. Id. at 902.
65. Id. The sales representatives referred to this type of conduct as
"boxing." Id.
66. Id. at 904.
67. Id. at 905.
68. Huddleston, 845 F.2d at 904.
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conclusion, the court found that the comments made by the male
sales representatives carried "sexual connotations," and therefore,
were based on gender. 9
In Huddleston, the court created the standard that a violation
of the gender relation test is clear when physical harassment is
involved, and the comments made to the female employee are
sexual in nature.7" However, most verbal hostile environment
cases do not consist of comments grounded in sexual epithets or
offensive and explicit references to women's bodies or their sexual
conduct."
The determination of whether the alleged verbal conduct was
based on gender is only the first step in the hostile environment
analysis.72 The second step, most often used to determine the
69. Id.
70. Id. See infra Part II.B. for a discussion of the sexual nature test. It is

interesting to note that the federal courts created another obstacle to genderbased sexual harassment by continually holding that conduct offensive to both
men and women employees does not constitute a violation of Title VII based on
sex. See Walk v. Rubbermaid, Inc., No. 94-4306, 1996 WL 56203, at *2 (6th

Cir. Feb. 8, 1996) (stating that the plaintiff failed to show that her supervisor

used abusive language towards her "based on her sex" since the supervisor
used the abusive language with both male and female employees); Johnson v.
Tower Air, Inc., 149 F.R.D. 461, 469 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that an
international flight manager's abusive language and obscene gestures to both
male and female members of an airline crew did not constitute actionable
sexual harassment); Linebaugh v. Sheraton Mich. Corp., 497 N.W.2d 585, 588
(Mich. 1993) (concluding that the plaintiff did not demonstrate that a sexually
explicit cartoon was "gender-oriented" because it depicted both plaintiff and a
male co-worker engaging in a sexual act). Only a few cases have held to the
contrary. See, e.g., Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334,
1337 (D. Wyo. 1993) (finding that a Title VII claim for sexual harassment was
not foreclosed by the fact that a supervisor's verbal harassment was directed
toward both male and female employees).
71. See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment,107 YALE L.J.
1683, 1687 (1998) (arguing that frequently sexual harassment does not consist
of conduct dealing with sexuality, but rather conduct dealing with gender).
See also infra Part II.B for a discussion of the lower court's recognition of
sexual conduct in order to create an actionable verbal sexual harassment case.
For example, in Walk, a female plaintiff alleged that her supervisor's conduct
created a hostile environment. 76 F.3d at 381. The conduct consisted of the
plaintiffs supervisor leaving plaintiff a voice mail message stating that she
was "fucking stupid" and inquiring "what kind of fucking manager are you?"
Id. Also, on two or three occasions as the plaintiff was walking by the
supervisor's office, he raised his hand and said "I have no time for you or your
fucking menopausal bitches." Id. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the statements made on voice mail were not gender-based for purposes of
Title VII. Id. at 382. However, the court did find that the statement using the
term "bitch" was in fact sex-based, which demonstrates the federal courts'
continuing failure to recognize gender-based comments that do not have
explicitly derogatory connotations to women. Id.
72. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1980). In the EEOC Guidelines, it is noted that
harassment not involving sexual activity or language may also give rise to
Title VII liability. See E.E.O.C. Proposed Guidelines on Harassment Based on
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"severity" or "pervasiveness" of the conduct, is to determine
whether or not the conduct was sexual in nature.73
B. The Sexual Nature Test
The lower federal courts have also created the sexual nature
test to determine whether the harassment is deemed sexual or
"non-sexual."' The first case to dismiss a plaintiffs claim because
the alleged harassment was "non-sexual" in nature was Turley v.
9
Union Carbide Corp."
In Turley, the plaintiff claimed that her
foreman "pick[ed] on [her] all the time" and treated her differently
than male employees.79 The Southern District of West Virginia
held that non-sexual conduct, where there was no evidence that
the foreman demanded sex from the plaintiff, touched her, or told
her sexual jokes, did not constitute sexual harassment. 7 The court
based its reasoning on the sexual harassment theory developed by
Catharine MacKinnon" and also on the EEOC Guidelines." The
court determined that "sex" does not mean gender; rather "it is
used pursuant to its more popular meaning."' This led to the
conclusion that "while... harassment may be directed at a
Race, Color, Religion, Gender, National Origin, Age, or Disability, 58 Fed. Reg.
51266, 51266 (1993) (noting that verbal or physical harassment based on
gender that creates a hostile environment is actionable).
The EEOC
recognized that non-sexual harassment that is based on gender can constitute
sexual harassment. Id. at 51267. The Proposed Guidelines were later
withdrawn for reasons unrelated to the provisions defining actionable gender
harassment. L. Camille Hebert, Sexual HarassmentIs Gender Harassment,
43 U. KAN. L. REV. 565, 565-66 (1995).
73. The EEOC defines sexual harassment as "unwelcome sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1980). This section of the EEOC Guidelines
has been read to limit harassment to sexual conduct. Id. § 1604.11. See
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing the EEOC
Guidelines as support that only evidence of unwelcomed sexual advances will
establish liability under Title VII); Turley v. Union Carbide Corp., 618 F.
Supp. 1438, 1441-42 (S.D. W. Va. 1985) (citing the EEOC Guidelines to
support the court's statement that harassment must "play[ I upon the
stereotypical role of the female as a sexual object" in order to be actionable);
Reynolds v. Atlantic City Convention Ctr., 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1852, 1867 (D.N.J. 1990) (using the EEOC Guidelines to conclude that only
harassment of a "sexual nature" would be actionable). See also Schultz, supra
note 71, at 1716 discussing the necessity for the lower federal courts to move
away from requiring sexual conduct in order to create a hostile environment.
74. Turley, 618 F. Supp. at 1442.
75. Id. at 1438.
76. Id. at 1442.

77. Id.
78. MACKINNON, supra note 25, at 1. Professor MacKinnon defined sexual
harassment as "the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the
context of a relationship of unequal power." Id.
79. Turley, 618 F. Supp. at 1441.
80. Id. at 1441-42.
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member of the female sex, it is harassment which plays upon the
stereotypical role of the female as a sexual object" that is
actionable."
After Turley, many other courts similarly dismissed hostile
environment sexual harassment cases on the basis that the
alleged conduct was non-sexual in nature.82 However, a few courts
took an opposite course. In McKinney v. Dole,83 the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia held that harassment need
not "take the form of sexual advances or of other incidents with
clearly sexual overtones."8'
5
Delgado v. Lehman"
followed in McKinney's footsteps.5 ' The
Eastern District of Virginia held that the plaintiff had established
a prima facie case of hostile environment sexual harassment
because "[slexual harassment need not take the form of overt
sexual advances or suggestions, but may consist of such things as
verbal abuse of women if it is sufficiently patterned to comprise a
condition and is apparently caused by the sex of the harassed
employee.8 7
81. Id. at 1442.
82. See, e.g., Hosemann v. Technical Materials, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 659, 663
(D.R.I. 1982) (finding plaintiffs allegations that a co-worker "always... tried
to make her do her work poorly" and that another had "embarrassed [her]
every work day... by not talking very good about females" were non-sexual
and therefore unactionable); Walker v. Sullair Corp., 736 F. Supp. 94, 100
(W.D.N.C. 1990) (concluding that "[slexual harassment based on a hostile
work environment exists where there are sexual advances, fondling or a
sexually suggestive workplace atmosphere that the claimant finds
unwelcome"); Wimberly v. Shoney's, Inc., 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 444,
453 (S.D. Ga. 1985) (concluding that "only shocking and pervasive sexually
oriented misconduct amount[s] to a Title VII violation").
83. 765 F.2d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
84. Id. at 1138. In McKinney, the plaintiff, a government employee, was
sexually harassed by her male supervisor at the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA). Id. at 1143. The supervisor exposed himself to
McKinney, rubbed up against her and asked for sexual favors, and assaulted
her by grabbing her arm and twisting it in an attempt to prevent her from
leaving her office. Id. at 1132. The supervisor contended that he was not
liable because McKinney did not suggest that there were any sexual
connotations involved in the physical assault incident. Id. at 1136. The court
disagreed and stated that the "[court had] never held that sexual harassment
or other unequal treatment of an employee ... must, to be illegal under Title
VII, take the form of sexual advances or of other incidents with clearly sexual
overtones." Id. at 1138. The court even went as far as stating that "any
disparate treatment, even if not facially objectionable, may violate Title VII."
Id. at 1139.
85. 665 F. Supp. 460 (E.D. Va. 1987).
86. In Delgado, a male supervisor repeatedly referred to the plaintiff as a
"babe" and frequently responded to her statements by saying "[1isten here
woman." Id. at 463. He also blew cigar smoke in her face and repeatedly
referred to other women in the office in a derogatory manner. Id.
87. Id. at 468 (citing McKinney, 765 F.2d at 1138). The court reasoned that
because the evidence had shown that the plaintiffs supervisor treated women
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McKinney and Delgado opened the door to a series of cases
holding that hostile environment sexual harassment need not be
sexual in nature.' Even though many courts now state that nonsexual conduct is actionable, verbal sexual harassment claims still
seem to require proof of sexually degrading comments before a
claim will be actionable.89 Thus, courts often disallow claims in
verbal sexual harassment cases if the defendant's language can be
characterized as non-sexual.
This trend is clearly shown in the Seventh Circuit's decision
in Baskerville v. Culligan International Co.' In Baskerville, the
plaintiff was a secretary in the marketing department of
worse than he treated men, the plaintiff had proven that she was a victim of
sexual harassment. Id. at 469.
88. See also Smith v. St. Louis Univ., 109 F.3d 1261, 1265 (8th Cir. 1997)
(reversing summary judgment for defendant in a hostile environment sexual
harassment claim where a chairman repeatedly spoke in a derogatory manner
towards a resident even though the harassment was not sexual in nature);
Kopp v. Samaritan Health Sys., 13 F.3d 264, 269 (8th Cir. 1993) (reversing
summary judgment for defendant where a doctor was abusive and threatening
to his staff even though the abuse was rarely sexual); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co.,
842 F.2d 1010, 1014-15 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding the defendant employer liable
where women traffic controllers were verbally and physically harassed
although various incidents were not sexual); Luttjohann v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 927 F. Supp. 403, 407-08 (D. Kan. 1996) (holding that a
supervisor's daily profane, gender-neutral, yelling at female area manager was
sufficient to state a claim of hostile work environment absent an allegation of
sexual advance as long as there was proof that profane ranting occurred
because of manager's gender).
89. Compare Hall, 842 F.2d at 1012 (concluding that construction worker's
references to female co-workers as "fucking flag girls," "[bilonde bitch[es]," and
"[hierpes" were sufficiently pervasive and severe to constitute a violation of
Title VII), and Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847, 883 (D. Minn.
1993) (concluding that co-worker's references to women as "bitch," "whore,"
and "cunt" violated Title VII), and Cline v. General Elec. Capital Auto Lease,
Inc., 757 F. Supp. 923, 926-27 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (concluding that harasser's
reference to female employee as "dyke," "dragon lady," and "syphilis"
constituted a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII), with Scott v.
Sears Roebuck & Co., 605 F. Supp. 1047, 1055 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (concluding that
plaintiffs claims that co-worker's repeatedly asked her out, came over to talk
to her, and flirted with her lacked severity because "[she] was not subjected to
vulgarity, demeaning comments, improper inquiries about her private
behavior or explicit propositions"), and Galloway v. General Motors Serv.
Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164, 1167 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding that male coworker's repeated usage of "sick bitch" in reference to a female employee was
not sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment
because "sick bitch" was not overtly sexual in nature), and Howard v. Beech
Aircraft Corp., No. 94-3259, 1995 WL 355252, at *2 (10th Cir. June 14, 1995)
(concluding that supervisor's comments to female plaintiff that she had
"Martha Lattamore syndrome" in reference to the size of the plaintiffs breasts
and that "the smartest woman at Beech was not as smart as the dumbest
man," were "not overtly sexual enough.., to support her sexual harassment
claim").
90. 50 F.3d 428 (7th Cir. 1995).
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Culligan.9 She was subjected to a series of harassing incidents by
her supervisor, which consisted of him calling her "pretty girl,"
making an "um, um,urn" sound when she wore a leather skirt, and
commenting on how hot his office became when she "stepped [her]
foot" into it.92 He also referred to the plaintiff as "Ms. Anita Hill,"
and when she once asked him why he left a company Christmas
party, he replied, "[I] didn't want to lose control, so I thought I'd
better leave."93
The court dismissed the plaintiffs sexual harassment claim,
labeling the supervisor's harassment as "merely unpleasant" as
opposed to hostile.94 Writing for the majority, Judge Posner
explicitly stated that because the supervisor never touched the
plaintiff, made threats to her, exposed himself, showed her dirty
pictures, or invited her to have sex with him or go out on a date
with him, the plaintiff had not established a cause of action under
Title VII. 99
All of the examples that the Seventh Circuit gave in
Baskerville to show actionable causes of hostile environment
sexual harassment were sexual in nature.
Thus, the court
indirectly held that comments that are non-sexual in nature would
not be actionable.9 This case, and others mentioned above, show a
trend by the lower courts to disregard the McKinney holding in
cases of verbal sexual harassment. In addition to the gender
relation and the sexual nature tests, some lower courts require a
third hurdle that a plaintiff must overcome to establish a valid
hostile environment sexual harassment claim. This third step, the
personal animosity test, is discussed below.

91. Id. at 430.

92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 431. The court went even further by attacking the plaintiff
personally stating that "only a woman of Victorian delicacy - a woman
mysteriously aloof from contemporary American popular culture" would find
the comments made by her supervisor to be harassing. Id.
95. Baskerville, 50 F.3d at 431.

96. Id. at 430. Posner eliminated non-sexual conduct from liability by
dividing sexual harassment into two categories:
On one side lie sexual assaults; other physical contact, whether amorous
or hostile, for which there is no consent express or implied; uninvited
sexual solicitations; intimidating words or acts; obscene language or
gestures; pornographic pictures. On the other side lies the occasional
vulgar banter, tinged with sexual innuendo, of coarse or boorish
workers.
Id. (citations omitted). By mentioning these classifications of sexual
harassment, Judge Posner was able to reason that the supervisor's harassing
conduct did not constitute hostile environment sexual harassment because it
did not fall into one of the categories. Id. As a result, unwelcomed non-sexual
harassment is not actionable because it is not mentioned on either "side" of the
actionable sexual harassment fence.
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C. The PersonalAnimosity Test
The first case to dismiss a plaintiffs claim on the basis that
the harassing behavior was due to personal animosity and not
gender was brought by a male. In Huebschen v. Department of
Health and Social Services,97 a male plaintiff brought an action
under the Equal Protection Clause alleging that his female
supervisor conditioned employment on granting sexual favors."' It
was established at trial, through testimony, that the two had
The Seventh
engaged in a consensual sexual relationship.9
Circuit concluded that when the consensual relationship ended,
the supervisor became spiteful toward the plaintiff and that her
motivation to harass was not based on his gender, but on the fact
that "he was a former lover who had jilted her." ' °°
The holding in this case has been applied to Title VII claims,
thus creating another way in which lower courts could dismiss a
plaintiffs hostile environment sexual harassment claim.01 As now
applied to Title VII cases, courts could dismiss a plaintiffs claim
for failing the "because of sex" provision or the gender relation test
by asserting that the harassing conduct was not based on gender,
but rather personal animosity between the victim and the
defendant."2 For example, in McCollum v. Bolger,"3 the Eleventh
97. 716 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 1983).
98. Id. at 1171-72.
99. Id. at 1169.
100. Id. at 1172.
101. See Morley v. New England Tel. Co., No. 82-1051-Z, 1987 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3107, at *24 (D. Mass. April 14, 1987) (concluding that while it was
clear from the evidence that a personality conflict existed between harasser
and victim, it was not clear that the conflict was based on sex); Bradshaw v.
Golden Rd. Motor Inn, 885 F. Supp. 1370, 1380 (D. Nev. 1995) ("Personal
animosity is not the equivalent of sex discrimination and is not proscribed by
Title VII. The plaintiff cannot turn a personal feud into a sex discrimination
case by accusation.") (quoting McCullom v. Bolger, 794 F.2d 602, 610 (11th
Cir. 1986)); Reyes v. McDonald Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 614,
617 (D.N.J. 1998) ("Plaintiff had a severe personality conflict with [harasser],
but this did not arise because of the sex of either party."). Courts have
dismissed hostile environment sexual harassment complaints despite noting
the inappropriateness of the harassing conduct. See, e.g., Baskerville v.
Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 431 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that the alleged
harasser "whatever his qualities as a sales manager, is not a man of
refinement; but neither is he a sexual harasser"); Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine
Div., 32 F.3d 1007, 1013 (7th Cir. 1994) (Coffey, J., dissenting) (disagreeing
that the conduct constituted sexual harassment, but noting that the conduct
was "appalling, disgusting and has no place in the work environment"); Penry
v. Federal Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 970 F. Supp. 833, 838 (D. Kan. 1997)
(dismissing plaintiffs claim because the "conduct, though offensive, cannot be
construed as being motivated by sexual animus or gender bias").
102. See infra Part II.C (giving examples of cases in which a plaintiffs claim
was dismissed on the basis that the discrimination was not "based on sex" but
rather personal animosity).
103. 794 F.2d 602 (11th Cir. 1986).
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Circuit dismissed a plaintiffs Title VII claim for reasons similar to
those in Huebschen. In McCollum, the plaintiff, a female mail
carrier, alleged that her postmaster discriminated against her by
reducing her mail route and classifying her at a lower pay level
than other mail carriers.'" The court concluded that the plaintiff
was not discriminated against because of her sex, but because she
had a bad relationship with her postmaster. 5 The court held that
"[plersonal animosity is not the equivalent of sex discrimination
and is not proscribed by Title VII. The plaintiff cannot turn a
personal feud into a sex discrimination case by accusation.""
The Seventh Circuit, which created the personal animosity
test in Huebschen, later applied it to a verbal sexual harassment
case in Galloway v. General Motors Service PartsOperations.°7 In
Galloway, as in Huebschen, the plaintiff and her co-worker had a
romantic relationship that eventually deteriorated.'" From the
time that the relationship ended until the plaintiff quit her job, the
co-worker repeatedly called the plaintiff a "sick bitch."'
The coworker also told the plaintiff "[i]f you don't want me, bitch, you
won't have a damn thing" and made an obscene gesture at her,
remarking "suck this, bitch.""'
After the court determined that the term "bitch" was not a
gender-specific or sexual term, it applied the holding from
Huebschen."' By using the personal animosity test, the court
concluded that the statements made by the co-worker were,
therefore, not based on the fact that the plaintiff was a woman.112
The court found that "[tihe repetition of the term together with the
other verbal conduct.., reflected and exacerbated
personal
5
animosity arising out of the failed relationship."
In direct opposition to the cases mentioned above, the Eighth
Circuit concluded in Burns v. McGregor that personal dislike is
irrelevant for purposes of Title VII."
The plaintiff in Burns
resigned after a co-worker called her a "bitch," "slut," "asshole,"

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 605.
Id. at 610.
Id.
78 F.3d 1164 (7th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1165.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1168.

112. Galloway, 78 F.3d at 1168.

113. Id.
114. 989 F.2d 959, 964-65 (8th Cir. 1993). See also Winsor v. Hinckley
Dodge, Inc., 79 F.3d 996, 1001 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that the gender-

neutral verbal abuse of a female automobile sales employee based on reasons
such as jealousy, dislike of her, and anger at her perceived preferential
treatment based on her special relationship with the sales manager was
irrelevant to her Title VII sexual harassment claim).
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and "cunt" during a heated exchange."' The court refused to
accept the defense's explanation that the heated exchange was a
result of personal dislike and not because of the plaintiffs
gender.'16
The court held that "[there is no excuse in any work
environment for subjecting a female worker to such verbal abuse
even if the harasser and the plaintiff did not like each other."117
The Burns case, therefore, disregarded the personal animosity test
created by the Seventh Circuit and preserved the plaintiffs verbal
sexual harassment claim.

III. THE SUPREME COURT'S LACK OF GUIDANCE IN HOSTILE
ENVIRONMENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES HAS ALLOWED LOWER
FEDERAL COURTS TO NARROWLY INTERPRET VERBAL SEXUAL
HARASSMENT CASES
The Supreme Court has provided little guidance to the lower
federal courts in regard to what constitutes a prima facie case of
hostile environment sexual harassment. 18 This lack of guidance
has led the lower courts to interpret verbal sexual harassment
claims narrowly. 9 The creation of the gender relation, sexual
nature, and personal animosity tests has allowed the lower courts
to dismiss many meritorious claims of verbal sexual harassment
which clearly would have been actionable under the plain meaning
and purpose of Title VII.1"

115. Burns, 989 F.2d at 964.
116. Id. at 965.
117. Id.
118. Thus far, the Supreme Court has decided only three hostile
environment sexual harassment cases in which the elements of a prima facie
case were discussed. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)
(stating that in order to establish a hostile environment the conduct must be
unwelcome and "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter conditions of victim's
employment and create an abusive working environment"); Harris v. Forklift
Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (clarifying the hostile environment claim by
stating that the conduct need not seriously affect an employee's psychological
well-being or lead the employee to suffer injury); Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Serv. Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79-80 (1998) (expanding Title VII protection
to same-sex harassment cases and further defining sexual harassment as the
exposure of one sex to "disadvantageous terms or conditions" of employment to
which members of the other sex are not exposed).
119. See supra Parts II.A, II.B, and II.C for a discussion and examples of the
gender relation, sexual nature, and personal animosity tests that the lower
federal courts currently use to decide hostile environment sexual harassment
cases.
120. See supra Parts II.A, II.B, and II.C for examples of cases in which the
lower federal courts dismissed a plaintiffs verbal hostile environment sexual
harassment claim after applying the gender relation, sexual nature, and
personal animosity tests.
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A. The Supreme Court'sDecisions in Meritor,Harris,and Oncale:
A Failureto Clarify What Type of Conduct Would Constitute a
Hostile Environment in Verbal Sexual HarassmentCases
Subsequent to the Supreme Court's decisions in Meritor and
Harris, the lower federal courts were left with only two
clarifications of the hostile environment analysis: the conduct
must be "severe or pervasive " "' and it need not affect the
"psychological well-being" of the plaintiff in order to be
actionable.122 As a result, these decisions gave a tremendous
amount of discretion to the federal courts as to what constitutes
actionable sexual harassment.
The problem with Meritor is that the range of conduct that
the Court held to create a hostile environment was extreme,
ranging from demands for sexual favors to rape. 24 This type of
extreme conduct was what the Supreme Court used to create Tthe
"severe or pervasive" requirement in hostile environment cases. 2
As a result, there is currently a consensus among federal
courts that hostile environment sexual harassment claims should
be recognized when the alleged conduct consists of unwelcome,
pervasive, and offensive physical touching of a sexual nature.
However, the courts fail to distinguish verbal sexual harassment
cases from claims such as the one in Meritor, in which the conduct
complained of was physical and therefore considered more

121. Meritor,477 U.S. at 67.

122. Harris,510 U.S. at 22.
123. 477 U.S. at 60. The plaintiffs supervisor subjected her to repeated
demands for sexual favors, and she had intercourse with him numerous times.
Id. The supervisor also fondled her in front of other employees, followed her
into the women's restroom where he exposed himself, and forcibly raped her
several times. Id.
124. Id. at 67.
125. See Schultz, supra note 71, at 1692-96 (discussing that in the current
state of sexual harassment law, most courts focus on harassment consisting of
sexual conduct). However, even extreme cases of sexual harassment can be
found to be non-actionable if the plaintiff does not establish the
unwelcomeness of the harassing conduct. See, e.g., Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d
484, 487 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that the plaintiff welcomed the sexual
harassment because she used offensive language, showed co-workers her
abdominal scar, gave gifts of a sexual nature to co-workers, and occasionally
did not wear a bra); Gan v. Kepro Circuit Sys., No. 81-268 C(5), 1982 WL 166,
at *1 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 7, 1982) (holding that a female plaintiff failed to allege a
hostile work environment on the basis that she continuously used vulgar
language, initiated sexually-oriented conversations with her co-workers, asked
male employees about their marital sex lives and whether they engaged in
extramarital affairs, and discussed her own sexual encounters); Weinsheimer
v. Rockwell Intl Corp., 754 F. Supp. 1559, 1563-64 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (holding
that a female employee failed to show hostile environment sexual harassment
because she frequently and actively participated in general sexual banter and
innuendo).
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severe. 126
Consequently, under the type of standard created in Meritor,
verbal sexual harassment cases are more difficult to prove than
physical harassment cases or cases where the harassment is
sexual

in nature. 127

The

Supreme

Court had

the perfect

opportunity to apply the "severe or pervasive" test to a case of
verbal sexual harassment in Harris.28 The plaintiff in Harriswas
subjected to repeated gender-specific statements and sexually
oriented conduct by her supervisor."8 The Court could have
clarified how to apply the "severe or pervasive" standard to verbal
sexual harassment cases. Instead, the Court's opinion only
focused on eliminating the lower court's requirement of "serious
psychological harm" in order for a plaintiff to have an actionable
hostile environment claim. 30
The latest Supreme Court decision further confuses the
Court's previous analysis of what constitutes a prima facie hostile
environment sexual harassment claim. The Supreme Court's
holding in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv. Inc. was narrowly

focused and only consisted of applying Title VII protection to
same-sex harassment cases."' In dicta, however, Justice Scalia
further confuses hostile environment analysis by quoting Justice
Ginsberg's concurring opinion in Harris. Justice Scalia states that
the proper analysis for sexual harassment cases should be
"whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous
terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other
sex are not exposed."" 2 With the Supreme Court focusing on the
"because of sex" provision of Title VII in Oncale,"' it now seems
that the Court has adopted the language frequently used by the

126. See discussion supra Parts II.A and II.B for citations of verbal sexual
harassment cases dismissed by the lower federal courts on the basis of lack of
severity.
127. Barbara L. Zalucki, Discrimination Law: Defining the Hostile Work
Environment Claim of Sexual HarassmentUnder Title VII, 11 W. NEW ENG. L.
REV. 143, 162 (1989).
12& See Schultz, supra note 71, at 1710-14 (noting that the Supreme Court's
decision in Harris failed to expand the concept of hostile work environment

harassment to include all types of gender-based discrimination).
129. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 19 (1993).

The plaintiffs

supervisor told her on several occasions, "You're a woman, what do you know"
and "We need a man as the rental manager." Id. At least once he called her
"a dumb ass woman" and suggested that the two of them "go to the Holiday
Inn to negotiate [her] raise." Id. He further suggested that she get coins from
his front pants pocket, threw objects in front of her and asked her to pick them
up, and made sexual innuendoes about her clothing. Id.
130. Id. at 22.
131. 523 U. S. 75, 81-82 (1998).
132. Id. at 1002 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 25).
133. Id.
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lower federal courts when applying the gender relation test. 3l
On its face, this language seems to be hinting that the
Supreme Court believes that non-sexual conduct can be the basis
for an actionable claim. If so, this adoption of Justice Ginsberg's
analysis would be more conducive to verbal sexual harassment
claims. However, it is not clear whether this language is to be
applied only to same-sex harassment cases or if it should be
applied to all types of hostile environment claims. It also is not
clear how this newly adopted analysis affects the "severe or
pervasive" test the Court created long ago in Meritor.
Furthermore, without more clarification by the Supreme
Court, this adoption of Justice Ginsberg's analysis seems to mirror
the application of the gender relation test that is currently being
used by the lower courts. 135 Therefore, the Supreme Court's dicta
in Oncale will only continue to support the denial of verbal sexual
harassment claims that are based on non-sexual conduct, until the
focus of sexual harassment law shifts from sex to disparate
treatment.
B. The Sexual /Non-Sexual Distinction
The lack of Supreme Court guidance with regard to hostile
environment sexual harassment claims has left the lower federal
courts to create their own standards for analyzing verbal sexual
harassment claims."' Due to the creation of the gender relation
and sexual nature tests and the lower courts' continuous denial of
claims in which the conduct was non-sexual in nature, many
victims of verbal sexual harassment have 3 been
denied protection
7
from disparate treatment in the workplace.

134. See supra Part II.A for a discussion of the gender relation test and the
"because of sex" provision applied by lower federal courts.
135. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80-81 (adopting Justice Ginsburg's "disparate
treatment" analysis and emphasizing that the harassing conduct does not
have to be sexual in nature to be actionable, but must be on the "basis of sex").
See also Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 153 F.3d 1531, 1537 (10th Cir. 1995)
(finding that Justice Scalia's emphasis that the harassment must be on the
"basis of sex" is merely an acceptance by the Court of the "because of sex"
language that the lower courts use when applying the gender relation test).
See also supra Part II.A for examples of the lower courts' use of the gender
relation test.
136. See supra Parts II.A, II.B, and II.C for a discussion of the gender
relation, sexual nature, and personal animosity tests, respectively. See also
supra notes 7-9 for the definitions of these tests.
137. See supra notes 59, 89 and discussion supra Parts II.A and II.B for case
examples illustrating the dismissal of verbal sexual harassment cases after
applying the gender relation and sexual nature tests.
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1. The Use of the Gender Relation Test as a Tool to Dismiss NonSexual Verbal Sexual HarassmentClaims
The lower courts' application of the gender relation test turns
on whether the verbal conduct alleged is gender-related or genderThis focus on gender-related conduct undermines the
neutral."
purpose of Title VII by denying all verbal sexual harassment
claims where the alleged conduct is devoid of sexually-charged
epithets traditionally used to degrade women.9
The lower federal courts almost always find for a female
plaintiff when it is shown that she was repeatedly referred to by
comments grounded in sexual epithets or explicit references to
women's bodies, such as "whore," "slut," and "cunt."" These type
of situations are held to fall under the "because of sex" provision of
Title VII because this type of sexually-degrading conduct is most
often used in reference only to women and not to men."" Thus, the
courts find no problem holding that the verbal conduct was "based
on sex" for the purposes of Title VII."
However, when a female is subject to verbal harassment that
can be directed at both men and women, the gender relation test
logically fails as a standard of analysis for determining whether
Verbal conduct that
the conduct is actionable under Title VII.
138. See supra notes 59 & 89 for cases illustrating the lower court's
categorization of the harassing language of those words used only towards
women and those used in reference to either men or women.
139. See infra Part IV and supra note 59 for examples and a discussion of
the type of language used to determine and dismiss cases where the gender
relation test was applied.
140. See Walk v. Rubbermaid, Inc., No. 94-4306, 1996 WL 56203, at *2 (6th
Cir. Feb. 8, 1996) (finding that the term "bitch" was sex-based); Steiner v.
Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the
use of the term "cunt" in reference to a female employee established a prima
facie case of hostile environment sexual harassment); EEOC v. A. Sam & Sons
Produce Co., Inc., 872 F. Supp. 29, 35 (W.D.N.Y 1994) (holding that the
reference to a female employee as a "whore" created a hostile environment);
Kulp v. Dick Horrigan VW, Inc., No. 93-5335, 1994 WL 3393, at *2 (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 3, 1994) (holding that the defendant's use of the term "slut" to refer to a
female employee, along with depriving her of certain privileges and assigning
her extra tasks, created a hostile environment).
141. See, e.g., Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1432-34 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding
that a supervisor's comments were frequently used to refer to women and not
men and therefore were gender-related).
142. See discussion supra Part II.A for an exception to this rule. But see
Galloway v. General Motors Serv. Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164, 1167 (7th
Cir. 1996) (demonstrating that even the repeated use of the term "bitch" can
be found to be non-gender related); Huddleston v. Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc.,
845 F.2d 900, 904 (11th Cir. 1988) (finding for the plaintiff on the basis of a
physical act and ignoring the repeated references to the plaintiff as a "bitch"
and "whore").
143. See Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1543 (10th Cir. 1995)
(deciding that the terms "ass" and "dumb" are expressions typically used to
refer to both sexes, and therefore are gender-neutral).
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has failed the gender relation test has consisted of terms such as
"dumb" and "asshole," in reference to female employees, or phrases
such as "get your buns over here," and "get [your] ass back in the
truck."1" These examples show how the gender relation test
allows verbal conduct that should be actionable to fall between the
cracks.
Even though these terms and phrases were directed at only
women employees, the lower courts denied the plaintiffs' claims
solely on the basis that the terms used by the harassers could also
have been directed at men and were, therefore, gender-neutral." 5
This analysis of the "because of sex" provision of Title VII denies
victims of verbal sexual harassment protection from inequality in
the workplace. Certainly the determination whether conduct is
actionable under Title VII should not be placed in the hands of the
harassers who can avoid liability by simply choosing their
harassing terms and phrases wisely.
2. The Sexual Nature Test is Merely the GenderRelation Analysis
in Disguise
Even though the McKinney case explicitly rejected Turley's
requirement that a sexual harassment claim include sexually
based conduct, this trend has not caught on with verbal sexual
harassment cases.'" Currently, a defendant's comments in a
verbal sexual harassment case must be sexually degrading in
order to survive the "severe or pervasive" prong of the Meritor
test. 147

It is true that a majority of the lower federal courts cite
McKinney in stating that sexual harassment does not have to
consist of sexual conduct." In verbal sexual harassment cases,
however, this analysis seems to be easily forgotten.' 9 In the
144. See cases cited supra note 59 for an illustration of the genderrelated/gender-neutral distinction.
145. See cases cited supra note 59 for an illustration of the genderrelated/gender-neutral distinction.
146. See discussion supra Part II.B for examples of cases denying non-sexual
verbal sexual harassment claims.
147. See discussion supra Part II.B for examples of cases associating
"severe" conduct with sexual conduct.
148. See Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988)
(holding that sexual harassment does not always require sexual conduct);
Weinsheimer v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 754 F. Supp. 1559, 1564-65 (M.D. Fla.
1990) (stating that non-salacious conduct can constitute sexual harassment);
EEOC v. A. Sam & Sons Produce Co., 872 F. Supp. 29, 34 (W.D.N.Y. 1994)
(citing McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1985)) (rejecting
defendant's argument that comments that were not "overtly sexual" were
insufficient to establish a hostile environment claim).
149. See Schultz, supra note 71, at 1732-38 (discussing the holding in

McKinney and its lack of influence on hostile environment sexual harassment
law).
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majority of these cases, the lower courts state that the alleged
conduct does not have to be sexual in nature. The court then,
however, requires that the victim prove that the harassment
occurred "because of the victim's sex" in order to establish a prima
facie case."5 Thus, when the lower courts apply the sexual nature
test, they merely return to the first step of analysis under the
gender relation test.
This is evident by a series of lower court decisions that were
based upon the sexual nature test. 5' Once again, as with the
gender relation test, terms such as "fucking flag girls," "blonde
bitch," "herpes," "dyke," and "syphilis" when analyzed under the
sexual nature test, were severe and pervasive enough to constitute
a hostile environment in violation of Title VII, but harassment
lacking sexually demeaning comments was not.'52 Thus, when
applying the sexual nature test to verbal sexual harassment cases,
women are once again denied protection from inequality in the
workplace under Title VII.
3. The PersonalAnimosity Test is Another Basis on which to Deny
a MeritoriousHostile Environment Sexual Harassment Claim
The Seventh Circuit's holding in Huebschen unleashed yet
another way in which the lower courts could dismiss valid hostile
environment sexual harassment claims. 53 The problem with the
personal animosity test is that it allows defendants to easily avoid
liability under Title VII. Defendants can admit to their harassing
behavior, but then escape liability simply by explaining that their
motive was not "based on sex" as required by Title VII,lM but
rather was based on personal dislike. 55
At first, this test was only applied to cases in which it was

150. See Hall, 842 F.2d at 1014 (holding that unequal treatment of an
employee or group must be based on the sex of that individual to be actionable
under Title VII); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486,
1522 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (stating that a claim for sexual discrimination requires
that the harassing conduct be "based upon sex"). See also Lehmann v. Toys 'R'
Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 602 (1993) (stating that in an action for hostile work
environment sexual harassment, harassing conduct need not be sexual in
nature because its defining characteristic is that harassment occurs "because
of [victim's] sex").
151. See discussion supra Part II.B for examples of cases in which the lower
federal courts applied the sexual nature test.
152. See cases cited supra note 88 (demonstrating the requirement that the
harassing conduct be sexual in nature).
153. See Huebschen v. Department of Health & Soc. Serv., 716 F.2d 1167,
1170-71 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that violations of Title VII require an
employee-employer relationship).
154. See supra Part L.A for the precise language of the statute.
155. See McCollum v. Bolger, 794 F.2d 602, 610 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding
that a plaintiff cannot base her sex discrimination claim on "personal
animosity").
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proven that the plaintiff and the accused co-worker had a romantic
relationship in the past.156 Currently, however, the test is being
applied liberally to cases involving all types of situations.'57 This
was demonstrated by the Eleventh Circuit's decision in
McCullomrn where no previous romantic relationship existed.
However, the court still dismissed the plaintiffs sexual
harassment claim because there was evidence that the postmaster
and the plaintiff had an acrimonious relationship in the past.'59
Even though Title VII was enacted to protect women from
disparate treatment in the workplace, the lower courts fail to
uphold this purpose when they apply the personal animosity
test."® The application of this test gives the impression that courts
allow sexual harassment in the workplace as long as the motive
behind it is personal dislike. This negative impression destroys
the very basis upon which Title VII was enacted - to eradicate
discriminatory treatment in the workplace.' 6'
IV. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD RETURN THE Focus OF HOSTILE
ENVIRONMENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW TO ELIMINATING
INEQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE

The gender-specific/gender-neutral component of the gender
relation test is perhaps the greatest obstacle to enforcement of
Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination. The use of these two
categories in verbal sexual harassment claims places the focus on
the specific words used and their context, instead of on the
harassment itself. This misplaced focus by the lower courts
obscures the big picture and results in rulings which run contrary
to the very purpose of Title VII.
A remedy to this problem has been proposed by some of the
lower courts only to be subsequently ignored by others.'
The
proper test to analyze a verbal sexual harassment case should be
"whether members of one sex are [subjected] to disadvantageous
terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other
sex are not exposed."' 63 A correct application of this test would
shift the focus from sexuality and return it to disparate treatment
156. See Huebschen, 716 F.2d at 1169 (noting that the plaintiff and his
supervisor had engaged in a consensual sexual relationship).
157. See cases cited supra note 101 and discussion supra Part II.C for an
illustration of cases in which the personal animosity test was applied.
158. 794 F.2d at 610.
159. Id.
160. See discussion supra Part II.C for citations of cases in which courts

have applied the personal animosity test.
161. See supra note 13 for a discussion of the congressional intent of Title
VII.
162. See supra Part II.A for a discussion of courts that use the disparate

treatment test and those that do not.
163. Harris,510 U.S. at 25.
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in the workplace.
The application of this test would also bolster the lower
courts' thus-far empty statement that sexual harassment need not
be sexual in nature. For example, if the Seventh Circuit had
applied this disparate treatment test to the facts from the
Galloway case, the case would have had a much different result.
It was not disputed that the male co-worker repeatedly referred
only to a female employee as a "sick bitch."'6 In applying the
disparate treatment test, it is obvious that the male co-worker
subjected the woman co-worker to disadvantageous terms or
conditions of employment to which other males in the office were
not exposed. Viewing the case this way takes the focus off of the
term "sick bitch" and places it back onto inequality in the
workplace.
This analysis would thus eliminate the Seventh
Circuit's need to compare "bitch" with "cunt" in order to determine
the level of severity required under the Meritortest.in
This analysis can further be applied to many of the previously
mentioned cases. Take, for example, the Baskerville case. In
Baskerville, the Seventh Circuit dismissed a plaintiffs claim
because the court indirectly labeled it as non-sexual." The facts
demonstrated that a male supervisor subjected only a female
employee to a series of comments ranging from calling her "pretty
girl" to commenting on how hot his office became when she
"stepped [her] foot" into it. 1 7 Once again, if the Seventh Circuit
had used the disparate treatment test, the case would have been
analyzed differently.
Since the male supervisor only made
harassing comments to a female employee, it would have been
easier under the disparate treatment test for the court to
determine that the female employee was subjected to sexual
harassment in the workplace.
Whether Baskerville would have survived the "severe or
pervasive" analysis created in Meritor is a different story. Simply
changing the focus of the verbal sexual harassment cases from the
specific words used to disparate treatment will not undermine the
Supreme Court's tests set forth in Meritor and Harris. A female
plaintiff still must establish that she is a member of a protected
class, that the harassment was unwelcome, that an injury was
suffered, and that the conduct was "severe or pervasive.""
In fact, the shift in focus may aid the lower courts in refining
the ambiguous "severe or pervasive" prong of the Meritor test with

164. Galloway v. General Motor Serv. Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164, 1165

(7th Cir. 1996).
165. Id. at 1168.
166. See Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 431 (7th Cir. 1995)
(holding that the defendant was not a sexual harasser).

167. Id. at 430.
168. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-69 (1986).
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regard to verbal sexual harassment cases. No longer will the
courts have to use the sexual/non-sexual distinction to determine
the "sever[ity] or pervasive[ness]" of the verbal harassment."
Instead, the courts can focus on whether the harassment "altered
the conditions of the victim's employment" and whether it "created
an abusive environment." 70 The answer to these two questions
will be easily determined when the harassing comments are
repeatedly made and subject one sex to "disadvantageous terms or
conditions of employment to which the other sex [is] not
exposed."'
Furthermore, the disparate treatment analysis would
eliminate the current illogical use of the personal animosity test
by the lower courts. For example, in McCollum, the plaintiff
alleged that her postmaster discriminated against her by reducing
her mail route and classifying her at a lower pay level than other
mail carriers.'
Under the disparate treatment analysis, the
female plaintiff would only have to prove that she was subjected to
harassment from her postmaster that males employees in the post
office were not. The courts could discontinue using the personal
animosity test as a means of dismissing sexual harassment cases.
Instead, the court could adopt the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit's
holding in Burns that a defendant cannot use personal dislike as
an excuse to subject a female plaintiff to verbal abuse in the
workplace.'73
Moreover, the shifting of the focus in verbal sexual
harassment cases from sex to inequality will not create an easier
way for plaintiffs to bring sexual harassment cases. The current
checks that have been put in place by the Supreme Court will
remain unaffected. Therefore, the same amount of protection will
exist against frivolous or meritless lawsuits.
If, however, as a result of the shift in focus, more plaintiffs
win their verbal sexual harassment claims, this would not suggest
that the new standard is too lenient. It would simply reflect and
remind us that sexual harassment is still a real problem in the
workplace and that the courts can no longer aid or ignore it by
splitting hairs and creating ways in which to distinguish and
ultimately dismiss meritorious claims.
CONCLUSION
The lack of guidance by the Supreme Court in regard to what
constitutes a prima facie case of hostile environment sexual
169. Id. at 67.
170. Id.
171. Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
See cases cited supra note 162 (discussing the "disparate treatment" test).
172. 794 F.2d 602, 605 (11th Cir. 1986).
173. 989 F.2d 959, 965 (8th Cir. 1993).
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harassment has led the lower federal courts to narrowly define
verbal sexual harassment cases. The current use of the gender
relation, sexual nature, and personal animosity tests has allowed
the lower federal courts to dismiss many meritorious verbal sexual
harassment claims.
The latest dicta by the Supreme Court suggests that the
Court believes that so-called "non-sexual" conduct can be the basis
for an actionable claim. Now is the time for the Supreme Court to
go one step further and adopt the disparate treatment analysis as
utilized in individual disparate treatment claims that allege
gender discrimination as the test for establishing a prima facie
hostile environment case. This shift in focus from a requirement
that the allegedly harassing language be of a sexual nature to the
gender inequality standard will assure that victims of verbal
sexual harassment are provided the protection that Title VII was
created to give them.

